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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Costs and Fees-Compensation of Referee in Bankruptcy
under Composition Agreement Where "Amount to be Paid" Is Partly Promises to Pay-A bankrupt corporation entered into a composition agreement
with its creditors, whereby it agreed to pay fifteen per cent of its obligations in
cash, and to issue bonds of the corporation for the remaining eighty-five per
cent. The offer in composition was confirmed by the court. The Bankruptcy
Act provides that referees shall receive as compensation one-half of one per
cent on the "amount to be paid" to creditors upon the confirmation of the
composition.1 The referee appealed from an order of the District Court awarding him compensation on the basis of the present estimated value of the bonds,
and of the cash agreed to be paid. The Circuit Court of Appeals modified the2
order so as to award compensation on the basis of the face value of the bonds.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, held, that the order of the District Court be
reinstated. Realty Associates Securities Corp. v,. O'Connor, 294 U. S. 701
(1935).
The Court pointed out that it was not reasonable to assume that Congress,
in fixing the compensation of referees, intended "payment" to include the bankrupt's promises to pay. As was pointed out in a previous issue of this REvIEw,3
the allowance of compensation beyond the actual market value of the bonds
unduly favored the referee at the expense of creditors.
Banks and Banking-Distribution of Insolvent Bank's Assets-Right
of Secured Depositor to Dividends from Estate of Insolvent Bank-Appellants, assignees of various trustees who were partially secured depositors in
trust company in hands of Secretary of Banking, excepted to partial account of
Secretary. The account showed that the amount realized by appellants from
the collateral they held was deducted from the amount owed appellants at the
time the bank was closed, and that dividends were declared only upon the balance owing them. Held, no error to dismiss the exceptions, as the fairest method
of distribution was used. In re United Security Trust Co., 117 Pa. Super. 429,
177 Atl. 588 (1935).

There are four lines of decisions, where partially secured creditors are
involved, determining the basis for distribution of an insolvent's estate:' (I)
the so-called bankruptcy rule, whereby (as in the instant case) the creditor is
required first to exhaust his security and credit the proceeds on his claim-or
to credit its value on his claim, and prove for the balance; 2 (2) the creditor
may prove his full claim, but receives dividends only on the amount due him
at the time of distribution; 1 (3) the creditor may prove for, and receive divii. 32 STAT. 799 (903),

II U. S. C.

A. § 68

(a)

(1927).

2. 74 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
3. (i935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 913.

i. See Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 135 (1899); (Note) L.
R. A. I918B 1024.

2. Citizens & Southern Bank v. Alexander, 147 Ga. 74, 92 S. E. 868 (917) ; Union and
Planters' Bank of Memphis v. Duncan, 84 Miss. 467, 36 So. 69o (1904), 52 U. OF PA. L.

Rrv. 659; see dissent of White, J., in Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131,
147 (1899).
3. State Nat. Bank v. Esterly, 69 Ohio St. 24, 68 N. E. 582 (1903),
REv.

125.

52 U. OF PA. L.
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dends upon, the amount due him at the time of proving his claim; 4 (4) the
so-called equity rule, which provides that the creditor can prove for, and receive
dividends upon, the full amount of his claim as of the time of the assignment
by his debtor, provided that he shall not receive more than the full amount due
him.5 Pennsylvania had consistently followed the equity rule in cases dealing
with insolvent decedents' estates and assignments for creditors; 6 but the instant7
case was differentiated upon the ground that it involved depositors, not creditors.
Having thus succeeded in treating the instant case as one of first impression,
the court applied the bankruptcy rule in determining the basis for distribution.
Fairness to all depositors was the reason advanced for this selection. 8 Under
the equity rule, on the other hand, the secured depositor is given both the advantage of his security and the right to have his dividends declared upon an
amount, part of which he has already recovered through his collateralf The
unfairness of the latter rule seems equally apparent, however, in cases involving
insolvent decedents' estates and assignments for benefit of creditors. 10 The
court in the instant case has perhaps laid the foundation for a complete reconsideration of the rights of all secured creditors upon the debtor's insolvency.

Banks and Banking-Preference-County's Right to Preference in
Assets of Insolvent Bank Where Public Funds Were Wrongfully Deposited
and Bank Gave Bond for Same- Plaintiff county's treasurer deposited in defendant bank, which filed a penal bond therefor, county funds in excess of the
one-half share for which defendant bank had been declared a depositary by
order of the county court. Defendant bank subsequently became insolvent.
Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to preference for the amount deposited
contrary to judicial order, on the ground that the bond protected the public
funds, and that therefore the unauthorized deposit was not so wrongful as to
constitute the bank trustee ex nualeficio. Polk County v. Farmers' State Bank
of Bolivar, 82 S. W. (2d) 577 (Mo. 1935).
Where public funds of a county ' have been deposited contrary to statute
or judicial order, the bank receiving the deposit is constituted trustee ex maleficio,
4. Levy v. Chicago Nat. Bank, i58 Ill. 88, 42 N. E. 129 (1895). The criticism of the
bankruptcy rule was that if, at any time after the insolvency, the secured creditor should
realize anything on his collateral, it would require a readjustment of the basis of distribution
for future dividends from the estate.
5. Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. I3 (1899) ; National Bank v.
Haug, 82 Mich. 6o7, 47 N. W. 33 (i89o) ; Graeff's Appeal, 79 Pa. 146 (1875). Theories
advanced in these cases were that the assignment sets up a trust in the assets, so that at that
time each creditor secures a vested interest in the assets of the insolvent, in proportion to the
amount owed each creditor at the time of the assignment, and that this proportionis not subject to later change. The contract of pledge beween borrower and lender was also emphasized.
6. Miller's Appeal, 35 Pa. 481 (i86o) ; Graeff's Appeal, 79 Pa. 146 (1875).
7. The distinction between a deposit and a loan has often been made the basis for differing legal consequences. See Law's Estate, 144 Pa. 499, 507, 22 Atl. 831, 832 (1891).
8. Instant case at 436, 177 Atl. at 591.
9. See First American Bank & Trust Co. v. Palm Beach, 96 Fla. 247, 263, 117 So. 900,
9o6 (1928).
10. National Union Bank of Md. v. National Mechanic's Bank of Baltimore, So Md. 371,
3o Atl. 913 (1894) (assignment for benefit of creditors) ; Wheat v. Dingle, 32 S. C. 473

(1889) (insolvent decedent's estate).

i. The rule applies also to municipalities and school districts. New Hampton v. Leach,

201
320

Iowa 316, 2o7 N. W. 348 (1926)

(Utah

1932)

(school board).

(city); Tooele County Board v. Hadlock, ii P. (2d)
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the county being the beneficiary.2 Upon the subsequent insolvency of the bank,
the county by virtue of the trust relationship is entitled to a ' preference in the
distribution of its assets.' Basically, this trust formula was developed by the4
courts to protect public funds from the unlawful actions of political officials,
even if at the expense of general depositors. In view of the protection accorded
the funds in the instant case by the bond, the court saw no reason to construct
a trust.' At the same time, the often neglected general depositors benefited.8
If, however, shortly after judgment the surety became insolvent, there would
exist the very condition which the constructive trust device was designed to
meet; yet the court would have precluded protection of the public funds. On
the other hand, the giving of a preference to the county while the surety remained solvent would aid, at the expense of general depositors, not the public,
but a private surety.7 Perhaps the most cautious way of handling such a situation would be a refusal to allow the county's suit against the bank unless it had
first proceeded against the surety or shown that the surety was insolvent., If
the surety after payment to the county proceeded, as subrogee, against the bank,
the court could well refuse a preference. 9 On the other hand, if the surety
had become insolvent the court could impress a trust in favor of the county;
for the facts would then show that the funds were not protected.
2.
(3912)

Yellowstone County v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 46 Mont. 439, 128 Pac. 596
; Grand Fork County v. Baird, 54 N. D. 315, 209 N. W. 782 (926).

3. Provided that the funds can be traced. Yellowstone County v. First Trust & Savings
Bank; Grand Fork County v. Baird, both szapra. note 2.
4. At common law the state, as a sovereign, had an absolute right to preference in the
assets of an insolvent debtor. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bramwell, io8 Ore.
261, 217 Pac. 332 (1923) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. McConnell, 148 Tenn. 656, 257 S. W.
410 (1923)

; Note (933)

8I U. OF PA. L.

REv.

441, 442. Probably a majority of the Ameri-

can states still are awarded that preference, although there is a very respectable minority
which holds either that such discrimination is repugnant to our democratic form of government, or is prone to find waiver of the sovereign right by non-usage, acceptance of a bond,
; Fidelity & Casualty
etc. Potter v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 1i1 Miss. 823, 58 So. 713 (II)
Co. v. Union Savings Bank Co., ii9 Ohio St. 124, 162 N. E. 42o (i928). No courts grant an
absolute right to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Bramwell, 12 F. (2d) 3o7 (D. Ore. 1926) ; County Court v. Mathews, 99 W.
Va. 483, 129 S. E. 399 (925).

5. The court distinguished between what it considered a mere technical infraction of the
judicial order, and such a wrongful act as would result in non-protection of the public funds.
Could there be positive proof that the surety would remain solvent sufficiently long to meet
the full demands of the county, the court's decision, as is suggested, would be justified.
6. Because the assets from which the general depositor achieves his return is to the
extent of the denied preference increased.
7. In this conflict between the interests of the general depositors and those of the surety,
the merits would seem to favor the general depositor. The surety is paid to take the risk of
the bank's insolvency, and can, by adjusting its rates to meet legal increases of the risk,
spread the loss more generally. The possible saving to the state from cheaper premiums
given by bonding companies because of the preference right to which the latter can be subrogated, hardly seems substantial enough to override the equity of the general depositors. See
Note (I933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 44i.
8. This may be unnecessary, for the surety if solvent generally pays without forcing the
county to resort to court action.
9. Courts have rarely gone out of their way to protect bonding companies. Rather, they
have denied to them some of the rights of the creditor into whose place the surety sought to
be subrogated. In. re South Philadelphia State Bank's Insolvency, 295 Pa. 433, 146 Atl. 520
(1929). Therefore, there seems to be no doubt that had the present action been brought by
the surety (after it had indemnified the county) against the bank, the Missouri court would
have found no right to preference to which the surety could be subrogated. But if there
had been declared a preference in favor of the county, there would be substantial reason to
believe that if the surety sought subrogation to this right to preference the court might have
found a means to deny it. Almost universally, however, the surety has been allowed the
right to be subrogated as a general creditor.
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Breach of the Peace-Nature of the Offense-Words of Opprobrium
Addressed to a Police Officer as Constituting the Crime-Relator, a woman
detained on an information charging disorderly conduct tending to breach the
peace,1 sought a writ of habeas corpus. The sole criminal conduct alleged was
shouting "Mind your own God damn business . . ." to a policeman in a city
street at ii P. M., there being no other persons present. Held (two judges
dissenting), that the writ should be dismissed, since the facts averred were sufficient to charge the crime. People ex rel. Conley v. Frank, 281 N. Y. Supp. 158
(App. Div., 3rd Dep't 1935).
It is generally said that conduct violating the "public order" or tending to
incite others to violence constitutes a breach of peace.2 Since this vague concept dispenses with any necessity of an actual public disturbance, its ready
application to an ever broadening variety of situations by the courts is not surprising.3 The rapidly increasing complexity of society has, to be sure, its concomitant increased pressure upon the individual to regulate his existence so as
least to offend his neighbor.4 Such a development, however, suggests the possibility that courts may occasionally be over-zealous in the protection of particular
interests in the modem state. 5 Especially troublesome in these times of increasing
political unrest is the problem of the relation of the dissentient individual to
the police officer, who may be regarded as a representative of majority groups
in a democracy. Since the most trivial appearing of controversies arising out
of this relation may involve considerations of the gravest sort, it becomes manifest that courts at all times should scrutinize closely the official conduct of
policemen. Apparently this fact has led some courts, when confronted with a
situation like that of the instant case, to declare flatly that opprobrious words
addressed to an officer do not tend to breach the peace.' Other courts have
advocated a contrary result.7 This latter attitude, logically supportable perhaps, 8 may be criticized on the practical ground that the average policeman not
only is well conditioned to the use of offensive language,9 but also is often prone
i. NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 722 (i).
166 Ky. 39, 178 S. W. 1129 (1915); Davis v. Burgess, 54
Mich. 514, 20 N. W. 540 (1884).
3. Interesting cases evincing this tendency are People v. Glison, 100 Misc. 354, 166 N. Y.
Supp. 7I (Gen. Ses. N. Y. County 1917) (distributing pamphlets decrying U. S. entry into
Great War along path of patriotic parade) ; People v. Dominico, 12 Misc. 92, 253 N. Y.
Supp. 849 (Spec. Ses. N. Y. City 1931) (following iceman, listing his customers) ; People v.
Lebensart, i44 Misc. 671, 259 N. Y. Supp. 309 (Spec. Ses. N. Y. City 1932) (making false
statement to customer that store help was on strike).
4. (935) 3 J. B. A. KANS. 222, 224. For a lively discussion of modern aspects of this
development, see BATEs, THIS LAND OF LiBEaR- (193o) 3-26.
5. Much literature has been devoted to this topic. Particularly provocative of thought
are HAYS, LET FRzDom RING (1928); CHAFEFo FREEmDO
OF SPEECH (1920); Cushman,
Civil Liberties (1930) 3 ExcYc. Soc. SCIENCES 509. See also the numerous bulletins and
pamphlets of the American Civil Liberties Union.
6. Salem v. Coffey, 113 Mo. App. 675, 88 S. W. 772, 93 S. W. 281 (Kans. City Ct. Ap.
19o5) ; State v. Moore, 166 N. C. 371, 81 S. E. 693 (1914) ; People v. Lukowsky, 94 Misc.
500, 15g N. Y. Supp. 599 (Gen. Ses. N. Y. County 1916) ; Williams v. State, 21 Tex. App.
256, 17 S. W. 624 (1886). But see De Soto v. Hunter, 145 Mo. App. 430, 435, 122 S. W.
1092, 1093 (St. Louis Ct. Ap. I9O9), criticizing Salem v. Coffey, supra.
7. Elmore v. State, I5 Ga. App. 461, 83 S. E. 799 (1914) ; People v. Sadowsky, 149
Misc. 583, 267 N. Y. Supp. 762 (Albany Police Ct. 1933) ; Pavish v. Meyers, 129 Wash. 6o5,
225 Pac. 633 (1924) ; cf. Davis v. Burgess, 54 Mich, 514, 518, 2o N. W. 540, 542 (1884)
(ordinance made use of indecent language on street a crime) ; Warwick v. State, 17 Ind. App.
334, 46 N. E. 65o (I897) (crime to provoke another having "present! ability" to commit an
assault). The last two cases are cited frequently on the point in issue, apparently without a
close analysis of the ,facts. Since the field presented by the principal case is a narrow one, it
seems well to consider in this discussion all cases which have been regarded as significant.
8. See Elmore v. State, I5 Ga. App. 461, 463, 83 S. E. 799, 8oo (1914).
q. This observation is made in the dissenting opinion of the instant case, at 161.
2. Delk v. Commonwealth,
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to indulge in conduct of a highly provocative nature.' 0 Moreover, and far more
important, possible infringements of human liberties long regarded as essential
in a democracy would seem to outweigh greatly an occasional ruffling of a sensitive officer's feelings. Since the attitude of the New York courts toward this
problem was not clearly defined until the instant decision, the result must be
regarded as unfortunate."

Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Federal Statute Permitting
Insolvent Public Debtors to Make Readjustment of Their ObligationsThe Sumners Act I amended the Bankruptcy Act 2 to permit insolvent political
subdivisions of any state to file a petition in a federal court for readjustment of
their debts. Petitioner, a California irrigation district, filed a petition in a
federal court under the Sumners Act, alleging inability to meet its obligations.
Thereafter, the California Legislature passed an act 3 ratifying the proceedings.
Some of petitioner's creditors moved to dismiss the petition. Held, that the
Sumners Act is constitutional, as a valid exercise of Congress' power to enact
bankruptcy legislation. 4 In re East Contra Costa IrrigationDist., IO F. Supp.
175 (N. D. Cal. 1935).

The instant case reached a conclusion contrary to that of In re Cameron
County Water Improvement Dist. No. i,' criticized in a former issue of this
REVIEW. 6 In the instant case, the legislature's ratification supplied the important
factor of state consent, lack of which, in the Cameron County case, was deemed
controlling. 7 The decision is in line with the current trend upholding the constitutionality of other recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.8

Contracts-Requisites and Validity-Obligation of Railway Relief
Department to Employee Whom It Has Treated as a Member under Mistake as to Identity-Two employees with identical names applied for membership in the "Relief Fund" managed by defendant railway's Relief Department. The application of one was granted, but the certificate of membership
was sent to the other, who was thereafter accorded the benefits ' of membership
I0.Cf. Scott v. Feilschmidt, 191 Iowa 347, 182 N. W. 382 (1921) (officer arrested young
.girl who rebuffed his attentions) ; People v. Sternberg, 142 Misc. 6o2, 254 N. Y. Supp. 488
(Spec. Ses. N. Y. City 393i) (officer engaged defendant in parking squabble, arrested him
for shouting).
ii.Even granting the majority's premise that opprobrious words to an officer might tend
to breach the peace, the mild oath in the instant case can hardly be said to have had that
tendency. The majority view seems to lend sanction to an ill-disguised form of petty
vengeance.
I. 48 STAT. 798,
2. 30 STAT. 544

3.
4.
5.

11 U. S. C. A. §§ 301-303 (Supp. I934).
(3898), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ Iet seq. (1927).
Cal. Laws 1934, c. 4, § 7a.
U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl.
4.
9 F. Supp. 3O3 (S.D. Tex. 1934).
(935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 920.

6.
7. Cf. (1935) 48 HARv. L. Rv. 1435.

8. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 294 U. S.648
(I935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 913; In. re Central Funding Corp., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935); Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). But cf.
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 294 U. S.702 (935).
i. Free hospitalization in an institution devoted exclusively to the care of members.
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until his death eight years later. There was conflicting evidence as to whether
premiums had been deducted from the pay of the deceased. 2 The widow sued
on the certificate for the death benefits. Held (one justice dissenting), that
the defendant was estopped to deny that the apparently valid certificate was
in fact a valid contract. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Williams, 50 Ga. App. 726,
179 S. E. 136 (1934).

The facts of this case seem to have presented a unique situation to the
court for adjudication. A more satisfactory approach to the problem might
have been found in the application of certain basic principles of the modem
law of contracts. The deceased clearly made an offer,3 the consideration called
for being a promise by the defendant. 4 Under the objective theory the offeree's
conduct in sending this certificate, which clearly manifested an assent to the
offer in the eyes of a reasonable man in the position of the offeror, created a
contract.5 Notwithstanding a unilateral mistake, strict adherence to this theory
results in the conclusion that a valid contract was formed, rather than an apparently valid one. 6 Broad grounds of public policy support this result; reasonable men may contract and then safely order the course of their lives in reliance
thereon without fear that their plans may be disrupted because of the vagaries
or carelessness of another party. Once a contract is found to exist, it is clear
that the defendant's obligation is based on this contract, not on estoppel. When
the contract, as here, has been partly executed, and the restoration of the status
quo ante thus rendered impossible, even equitable relief in the nature of
rescission will be denied the party who contracted under mistake. 7

This is the

nearest approach to an estoppel in such a case, but even here rescission must
be denied on the broader ground that the equities of the situation are no longer
with the mistaken party. Although apparently regarded as unimportant by
the court, the payment or non-payment of premiums would seem to have considerable bearing on whether there was a justifiable reliance, necessary to create
2. The rules of the "Relief Fund" provided that the rights qf the members should not be
affected through failure of the railroad to deduct the premiums.
3. The terms "offer" and "acceptance" are used advisedly; the question of delivery and
acceptance of a policy of insurance has no application to the instant case. Courts and writers
seem to concur in the opinion that relief departments have none of the characteristics of insurance companies, and that the contracts are substantially contracts relating to employment
and not to insurance. Beck v. Pennsylvania L R., 63 N. J. L. 232, 43 Atl. 9o8 (Sup. Ct.
1899) ; Colaizzi v. Pennsylvania R. R., 2o8 N. Y. 275, ioi N. E. 859 (1913) ; see i CooiEY,
Bxrms ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1927) 35.

4. A bilateral contract was probably intended.

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (932)

§31,

can be invoked in favor of this construction.
5. Williston, Mutual Assent in. the Formation of Contracts (1919) 14 ILL. L. REV. 85;
Costigan, Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent (192o) 33 HARv. L. Rav. 376. This
is the theory running through the REST.TEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932).
But see Whittier,
The Restatement of Contractsand Mutual Assent (1929) 17 CAIF. L. REv. 441.
6. John J. Bowes Co. v. Town of Hilton, 255 Mass. 228, 151 N. E. 116 (1926); see RESTAT MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 503. The mistake in the principal case involved a peculiar

combination of mistake relating to the subject matter of the contract and mistake relating to
the identity of the person contracted with. When the mistake is a unilateral one of the former
type, the law is fairly clear that a valid contract should result, although there is considerable
dispute as to if and when it is voidable. But see Whittier, siepra note 5, at 442, advocating
the imposition of a tort liability instead of contract-at least in telegraph cases. Most cases
relating to mistake of identity involve deception and fraud on the part of the other party.
When those considerations are not present, there would seem to be the same basic grounds
of public policy in favor of applying'the objective theory as exist in the case of a mistake
relating to the subject matter. See 3 WmlSTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1558 and n. 92, supporting this position.
7. Hayes v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.. 228 Mass. 122, 117 N. E. 191 (1917) ; Young v.
Springer, 113 Minn. 332, 129 N. W. 772 (1911) ; Note (927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 6o.
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an estoppel, by the deceased; s whereas under the theory here advanced, the
department's failure to deduct premiums would, if anything, be a breach of
contract by the defendant.'

Criminal Law-Appeal-Abatement of Appeal on Death of AppellantDefendant was convicted of robbery. Pending appeal, he committed suicide.
Held, that the appeal must be abated, since his death deprived the appellate
court of jurisdiction. Griffin v. State, 83 S. W. (2d) 965 (Tex. 1935).
Of the jurisdictions where this problem has arisen, all but Kansas have
held that the appeal abates on the death of appellant.' Some of these jurisdictions, including Texas, hold that the proceedings are abated from the very
beginning, including the verdict and judgment in the lower court; I other jurisdictions abate only the appeal, leaving the judgment in full force. 3 The legal
effects of the two views are quite different. In some of the former jurisdictions
the estate has been held not liable for fines imposed on defendant, 4 and in
others for costs of the lower court judgment.' In the latter jurisdictions, however, the estate is liable for the costs.6 It seems that this gives the heir an
interest similar to that which he had at common law in the case of attainder of7
felony, where the forfeiture of estate gave him a sufficient interest to appeal.
However, only Kansas 8 allows this appeal for costs; other courts say that costs
are merely incidental to the judgment and that the appeal must abate.9 Again,
insurance conditioned on deceased's not having committed a felony can be recovered in the jurisdictions where proceedings are abated from the beginning. 0
But in the latter jurisdictions, apparently, it may not be recovered. On the
other hand, in such cases these jurisdictions might permit the heir to appeal,
for if the objection to recognizing costs as a sufficient interest is their relative
8. This appears to follow regardless of the rule of the Relief Fund, supra note 2. The
familiar principle that where evidence conflicts the court will be held to have found as true
those facts essential to support the verdict, could be invoked, however, to support the present
decision.
9. Another, but less desirable, method of deciding this problem would be to apply RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 9o: "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the
promisee, and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise."
I. United States v. Mitchell, 163 Fed. 1014 (C. C. D. Ore. igo8) ; State v. Catron, 207
Iowa 318, 222 N. W. 843 (5929) ; Commonwealth v. Crowley, 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 618 (9o5);
Note (1934) 96 A. L. R. 1322. Contra: State v. Fisher, 37 Kan. 404, 15 Pac. 606 (1887).
2. United States v. Mitchell, 163 Fed. io4 (C. C. D. Ore. i9o8) ; People v. St. Maurice,
166 Cal. 201, 135 Pac. 952 (913) ; State v. Kriechbaum, 258 N. W. iso (Iowa 1934), 96 A.
L. R. 13,7 (934); Scott v. American Express Co., 233 S. W. 492 (Mo. i92i); Boyd v.
State, 3 Okla. Crim. R. 684, ioS Pac. 431 (i91o) ; March v. State, 5 Tex. App. 450 (0879).
3. Gibson v. State, 178 Ind. 315, 99 N. E. 424 (i912) ; Stanisics v. State, 90 Neb. 278,
133 N. W. 412 (ig)
; State v. Martin, 30 Ore. io8, 47 Pac. 196 (1896), (1897) io HARV.
L. REV. 453.
4. People v. St. Maurice, i66 Cal. 201, 135 Pac. 952 (1913).
5. State v. Kriechbaum, 258 N. W. iio (Iowa 1934), 96 A. L. R. 1317 (934).
6. Gibson v. State; Stanisics v. State; State v. Martin, all supra note 4.
7- Marsh's Case, Cro. Eliz. 225, 273 (Q. B. 1582).
8. State v. Fisher; State v. Ellvin, both supra note 2.
9. Gibson v. State; Stanisics v. State; State v. Martin, all supra note 4. These courts
argued that the only instance where an heir could continue an appeal at common law was in
the case of attainder of felony where there was forfeiture of estate, and that since there is no
longer forfeiture of estate, there is no longer occasion to permit an heir to appeal. They
did not consider the reason behind the old rule, namely, that the heir had a real interest in
the appeal, and that this is equally true of an appeal for costs.
io. Baker v. Modern Woodmen of America, 140 Mo. App. 619, 121 S. W. 794 (i9o9).
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smallness, this objection would not obtain in insurance cases, where the interest
might be financially greater even than that involved in forfeiture of estate. In
the former jurisdictions there is no legal stigma on the name of deceased, since
defendant is considered as having never been legally convicted.:" In the latter
jurisdictions, however, there remains a legal stigma, which the heir is not permitted to remove by appeal; apparently he is considered as having no legal interest in the reputation of his ancestor. Defendant himself is not permitted in most
12
jurisdictions to clear his name after he has paid the fine or served the sentence,
but a minority allows him the right to relieve himself of the legal discredit of
conviction.'13 However, this latter principle is apparently not extended to appeals
by the heir after death of appellant. 14

Injunctions-Racial Discrimination as a Ground for the Right to Picket
-Necessity of a Labor Dispute- Plaintiffs were retail storekeepers in a predominantly negro section of Baltimore. Defendant organized various colored
groups and engaged in picketing plaintiffs' stores, because of the latter's refusal
to employ one hundred per cent negro help. Held, that an injunction in favor
of plaintiffs be granted. Green v. Samuelson, 178 Atl. lO9 (Md. Ct. App.
1935).
The only other reported case of this kind was commented upon in an
earlier issue of this REviEW.' Following the prior decision, the court in the
instant case enjoined the picketing because of the absence of a "labor dispute." 2
While giving more consideration to the possibility of recognizing racial progress
as an objective quite as valid as winning a dispute over working conditions, 3 the
court was unwilling to give its complete approval to so novel a doctrine. Apparently desirous of fortifying its conclusion, the court made the additional
observation that it could not sanction picketing in negro districts without allowing such picketing in white sections, as well. Since equally difficult problems
of differentiation in connection with zoning ordinances and nuisance cases have
been found not insurmountable, this basis for the decision might better have
been omitted.
ii. "Defendant's right of appeal inhered in the prosecution from the beginning.

The question of defendant's guilt was therefore necessarily undetermined at the time of his
death." State v. Kriechbaum, 258 N. W. 1Io (Iowa 1934).
12. State v. Westfall and Mathews, 37 Iowa 575 (1873) ; State v. Conkling, 54 Kan. 1o8,
37 Pac. 992 (1894) ; State v. Cohen, 45 Nev. 266, 2Ol Pac. 1027 (1921), (1922) 35 HARV. L.
REV. 766. The theory id that since the judgment has been satisfied, there is no legal controversy presented by the appeal. "The stigma on his name forms no part of the legal
punishment involved; an appeal to remove it, therefore, involves no legal question and is
moot." (1922) 35 HARv. L. REV. 766.
13. Johnson v. State, 172 Ala. 424, 55 So. 226 (1911) ; Commonwealth v. Fleckner, 167
Mass. 13, 44 N. E. 1053 (1896) ; Barthelmy v. People, 2 Hill 248 (N. Y. 1842) ; People v.
Marks, 12o N. Y. Supp. iio6 (igo9) ; Roby v. State, 96 Wis. 667, 71 N. W. IO46 (1897).
14. Browning v. State, 68 So. 545 (Ala. 1915).
i. A. S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Misc. 363, 274 N. Y. Supp. 946 (Sup. Ct.
1934), (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. RLv. 383.
2. Direct action such as picketing, constituting ar undeniable threat to trade, has been
permitted only comparatively recently even in labor disputes, and then not in all states. For
a good general discussion see FR.NKFURTER AND GaEnExz, THE LABOR INJUNCriON (1930)
24

et seq.
3. The opinion does not indicate clearly the exact position of the court. No violence or

threatened breach of the peace was regarded as proved, and the court expressed a sympathy
with the avowed objectives of the defendants. Having apparently thus paved the way for a
recognition of the legality of the picketing, the court veered away from this conclusion on the
grounds indicated in the text.
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International Law-Recognition-Effect Abroad of Soviet Decrees
Nationalizing Russian Corporations-An insurance corporation, organized under the laws of Imperial Russia, deposited securities with the New York Superintendent of Insurance, as a domestic creditors' fund.' In 1918, the Soviet
government dissolved the corporation and nationalized its assets. Subsequently,
domestic claims having been satisfied, the New York courts ordered that the
balance of the fund be deposited with the defendant bank, as a depository of
the insurance company, to be withdrawn only by court order. The U. S. S. R.,
upon recognition by the United States, assigned to the latter the Soviet claim
to the deposit. The United States thereupon brought this action in the federal
court for an accounting and an injunction to keep the fund in defendant's possession pending sUit.2 Held (Manton, J. dissenting), that the suit could not be
maintained in a federal court, because the state court had previously acquired
jurisdiction of the res. United States v'. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 77 F.
(2d) 866 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
The court, in the dicta and dissent which rendered this case significant,
indicated that recognition of the Soviet government should retroactively validate
all Soviet decrees designed to terminate the juristic personality of corporations
created under the Tsar; and that consequently the corporate assets should become the property of the confiscating government, notwithstanding the fact that
those assets had been brought into the United States before the date of such
decrees.3 This discussion of a problem which faced the federal courts for the
first time, extends logically the principles of previous decisions in the same jurisdiction. The prior cases have held that recognition by the executive department
precludes the courts from impeaching foreign confiscatory decrees when the
disputed property had been brought into this country after its seizure.4 The
American view, its scope broadened by the instant case, is completely in accord
with that now followed by the European courts, 5 although for a brief interval
France 6 and Germany 7 refused to consider nationalization effective as to property outside Russia. New York alone has declared that "recognition does not
compel our courts to give effect to foreign laws . . . contrary to our public
policy." 8 The New York courts apply the same standard, their ". . . own
i.The deposit was required of foreign corporations by N. Y.
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(igo)

c. 28,

§§27, 28.

2. Presumably to prevent disbursement of the fund to directors, stockholders or other
claimants in the state court.
3. See principal case at 866, 868, 872-878.
4. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (iiS); Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,
246 U. S. 304 (1918). Recognition is a function of the Executive Department, and an occuri.ence of which the courts will take judicial notice. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250
(1897). There has been some intimation, however, that recognition is not retroactive in its
effect. See Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. N. Y. Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 379, 189 N. E. 456, 461
(934) ; cf. Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38 (U. S.1852) (a void private contract can not
be validated by subsequent recognition).
5.Lazard Bros. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., (1933) A. C. 289; Cie Nord de Moscou c.
Phenix Espagnol, Paris (3 Ch.) June 13, 1928, 56 JOUR. Du DRorr INTMNA. (Clunet) rig
(1929) ; Ginsberg v. Deutsche, Kammergericht, (1928) Juristische Wochenschrift 1232, cited
in Nebolsine, The Recovery of the Foreign Assets of Nationalied Rltssian Corporations
(1930) 39 YALE L. REv. 1131, 1145.
6. P-tat Russe c. Cie Russe de Navigation, Tribunal de Commerce de Marseilles, April
23, 1925, 52 JoUR. DU DROIT INTERNAT. (Clunet) 391 (1925) ; see Prudhomme, La Recol.naissance en France du gouvernement des Soviets, 52 JouR. u DROIr INTERNA'. (Clunet)
318 (1925).

7. Ginsberg v. Deutsche, Kammergericht, March 3, 1925 (1925) JuristischeWochenschrift
1300, cited and discussed in Wohl, The Nationalizationof Joint Stock Banking Corporations,
etc. (1927) 75 1U. OF PA. L. REv. 385 et seq.
8. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 9o, 193 N. E. 897, 903
(1934) ; see (1934) 83 U. oF PA.L. REv. 917.
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sense of justice and equity", 9 to all foreign legislation, whether or not the
promulgating government has been recognized. 10 Comity with the State Department, if not with Russia, should impel a reconsideration of so needlessly
independent a position. But however impolitic the New York rule may be, it is
even more vulnerable to criticism on the score of inconsistency. New York has
upheld Soviet laws confiscating property within Russia,"- but has refused to
treat similarly the decrees which destroyed corporations created by and resident
in Russia, when the property involved remained here. Such a distinction is
entirely unwarranted, as the subject matter of both laws lies within the borders
of the U. S. S. R.," so that in neither case is the legislation actually extraterritorial in its operation. 3 And when the court takes cognizance of the death
of the juristic person, the decedent's assets, wherever situated, should naturally
pass to the lawfully recognized heir, the Soviet government. This is certainly a
more salutary view than the alternative, which would treat the corporation as
still in existence, and would
4 therefore award the deposit to a group of irresponsible refugee directors.'

Powers--Exercise of a General Power of Appointment-Appointed
Property as Equitable Assets for Payment of Debts of Donee's EstateTestatrix had a life estate in a farm in trust with a power of disposition by will,
which she exercised by devising the farm to her daughter. Testatrix's own estate
being insufficient, and her creditors endeavoring to satisfy their claims from the
property appointed to her daughter, the latter brought a bill in equity, seeking a
declaration of rights in relation to the disposition of the farm. Held, for complainant, on the ground that, although the power was a general power of appointment,' the appointed property was not subject to the satisfaction of the
debts of the donee of the power. St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, 83 S.W.
(2d) 471 (Ky. 1935).
9.Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. N. Y. Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369, 378, i89 N. E. 456, 46o (1934).
lO. New York, as well as other jurisdictions, has given effect to the laws of unrecognized governments whose de facto existence was evident, when such actior was essential to
prevent extreme harshness. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E.
679 (1933) ; Banque Internat. de Petrograd c. Hausner, Swiss Federal Tribunal, Oct. lo,
1924, 52 JOURN. DU DROIT INTERAT. (Clunet) 488 (1925) ; see Dickinson, The Unrecognized
Governnent or State in English and Anerican Law (1923), 22 MICH. L. REv. 29. But see
Note (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 270, 271.
ii. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933).
12. See Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhardt, 109 U. S. 527, 537 (1883): "Whatever
disabilities are placed upon a corporation . . . and whatever legislative control it is subjected to at home must be recognized . . . elsewhere."
13. Aksionaire Obschestvo A. M. Luther v. Sagor & Co., [1921] 3 K. B. 532, 549; (934)
29 ILL. L. REv. 248, 251.
14. New York, in one case, refused to award the American assets of a Russian corpora-

tion to the directors, saying that whatever the legal status of the corporation might be, its
destruction must be considered effective, as a matter of "common sense." Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 24o N. Y. 149, i69, 147 N. E. 703, 709 (925). But cf. Petrogradsky
M. K. Bank v. National City Bank of N. Y., 253 N. Y. 23, 17o N. E. 479 (1930). See the
latter case at 30, for an excellent discussion of juristic personality by Justice Cardozo, who
indicates that the corporation survives "until law rather than might shall declare it at an
end." For the rights of directors, see Nebolsine, The Recovery ofi the Foreign Assets of
Nationalized Rissian Corporations (1930) 39 YALE L. REv. 1131, 1147-1153.

1. The distinction between a general and a special power is itself a much discussed question. The tendency seems to be to classify as general powers all those whereby the donee is

given freedom to name any appointees he desires, including himself, even though he may be
restricted to a particular method of execution-for instance, by deed or will alone. Leser v.
Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 193I); Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass. 200 (1879).
Contra: Wales' Adm'r v. Bowdish's Ex'r, 61 Vt.23, 17 At. iooo (1889).
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Both in England 2 and in a majority of American jurisdictions, the established rule has been that property, whether real or personal, which the donee
of a general power has appointed to a volunteer, will be treated in equity as
assets for the payment of the donee's creditors, to the exclusion of the appointee, in so far as the donee's own estate is insufficient. There are two
theories by which the courts commonly uphold this doctrine. One is that the
creditor has an equity superior to the appointee, based on a duty of the donee
to exercise the power in favor of his creditors; the appointment of volunteers
is then considered a fraud. 4 The other is that an absolute power of disposition
is such dominion over the property as to amount-at least for equitable pur8
poses 5 -to ownership, and to make it just to impose this incident of ownership.
7
Criticism of the prevailing rule, which comes chiefly from legal theorists, is of
a threefold nature: (i) it is illogical to regard the property as assets where the
donee has executed the power, and not to do so where he has failed to exercise
it; 8 (2) to exclude the appointee violates the intention of the donor as well as
that of the donee; 9 (3) neither the existence nor the exercise of a power over
property is able to vest an estate or legal interest therein in the donee. 10 Nevertheless, admitting in the first place that the distinction between executed and
unexecuted powers is illogical, this admission still does not impugn the equity
of the existing doctrine, but only indicates that its application would be equally
equitable in each class of case. 1 Moreover, the intention of the donor, in con2. O'Grady v. Wilmot, [1916] 2 A. C. 231; Lawrence v. Huxtable, [193i] I Ch. 347.
3. Jackson v. Franklin, 179 Ga. 840, 177 S. E. 731 (934) ; Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass.

(1879). The rule has been followed or expressly recognized in ten states, as well as by
the Supreme Court of the United States. Seven other states have embodied the effect of the
rule, at least as to real estate, in statutory provisions patterned after those in the New York
Real Property Law of 19o9. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 193o) c. 51, §§ 149, 150.
4. Shattuck v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, 118 N. E. 889 (1918); O'Grady v. Wilmot,
[1916] 2 A. C. 231.
5. Even the courts which uphold the doctrine and treat the property as assets in equity
for the purpose of satisfying the donee's debts plainly recognize that it is not to be so treated
at law-=for purposes of taxation, for instance-since the legal property is clearly not in the
donee. United States v. Field, 255 U. S. 257 (1921) ; Hill v. Treasurer, 229 Mass. 474, 11S
N. E. 891 (1918).
6. Johnson v. Cushing, 15 N. H. 298 (1844) ; see Gilman v. Bell, 99 Ill. 144, 150 (1881).
In the early English cases out of which the doctrine of equitable assets developed, the courts
regarded a right of enjoyment coupled with an absolute power of beneficial appointment as
the equivalent of an absolute property. The donee of such a power was "owner in equity."
Ashfield v. Ashfield, 2 Vern. 287 (Ch. 1693). And even a century later, an estate subject to
appointment by the equitable life tenant was said to be "as absolutely hers as any other part
of her property", and passed under the residuary clause of her will. Standen v. Standen, 2
Ves. Jr. 589, 594 (Ch. 1795). But this attitude was finally repudiated, and appointed property ceased to be regarded as part of the estate of the donee. Bradly v. Westcott, I3 Ves. Jr.
445 (Ch. 18o7) ; Barford v. Street, 6 Ves. Jr. 135 (Ch. i8o9).
7. The instant case represents the latest addition to the small group of American courts
that have cared or dared to embody these criticisms in judicial decisions repudiating the accepted rule: Mercantile Trust Co. v. Bergdorf & Goodman Co., 167 Md. 158, 173 Ati. 31
(1934) ; In re Dunglison's Estate, 2Ol Pa. 592, 51 Atl. 356 (19o2) ; Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 142 Atl. 531 (1928) ; Humphrey v. Campbell, 59 S. C. 39,
37 S. E. 26 (1900), 48 U. OF PA. L. REv. 739.
8. See I STORY, EQUITY JURISPIAUDEINCE (I4th ed. 1918) § 250, n. 3; Note (1929) 59 A.
L. R. 1510, 1512.
9. See Commonwealth v. Duffield, 12 Pa. 277, 279 (1849) ; I STORY, loc. cit. supra note
8; (1929) 77U. OF PA. L. REv. 422; Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1510, 1523.
io. See Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony, 49 R. I. 339, 343, 142 Atl. 531, 534
(1928) ; (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 422.
ix. See 4 KENT'S COMMENTARIES (I4th ed. 1896) *339-341; cf. Holmes v. Coghill, 12
Ves. Jr. 2o6, 216 (Ch. 18o6), wherein the court suggests for the consideration of the legislature the desirability of declaring that where a power is given to dispose of property, if the
party dies without exercising the power, still the property shall be regarded as assets. The
200
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ferring utter freedom of disposition, would seem to be clearly satisfied by any
use of the power whatsoever, whether it be to please the donee's fancy or to pay
his obligations; while in regard to the donee, the proper consideration for the
purposes of equity should be, not what he actually intended to do with the
property, but what, in good conscience and as a man of integrity, he shodd
have intended.: 2 And finally, while there can be no dispute as to the proposition
that a power over land is not an estate therein,13 the extent of such an argument
is only that appointed property is not assets at law; it overlooks the fact that
the doctrine which it attacks is a purely equitable one. Unfortunately, the chief
result of the view followed in the instant case would seem to be to create a
judicially recognized method of enabling a debtor to pass by his creditors when
he not only should but can pay his debts.

Sales-Conditions and Warranties-Rights of Third Parties under
Implied Warranty of Merchantability-Plaintiff bought from a baker pork
pies made from pork purchased of defendant meat dealer, and became sick
because of contamination present when meat left defendant's hands. Held, for
defendant, since an implied warranty of merchantability does not run to any
but the immediate purchaser. Ahern v. Foster Beef Co., 177 Atl. 656 (N. H.
1935).'
The law relating to the liability of a seller of impure food to others than
his immediate vendee is much confused. 2 A majority of courts, like the court
in the instant case, deny any recovery in the absence of affirmative proof of
that the implied warnegligence.3 Others, while recognizing the general rule
ranty of merchantability set forth in the Sales Act 4 benefits only immediate
vendees,5 make an exception in the case of food-holding that the warranty
runs in favor of third persons. 6 Still others deny recovery on an implied warranty but say that the presence of contamination in food prima facie establishes
negligence.7 Again, a number of courts, in allowing recovery, mention both
negligence and implied warranty but fail to state on which ground they rely.8
procedural rule that equity will aid a defective execution but cannot cure a non-execution
seems, however, to be too firmly entrenched to allow hope of change by judicial decision.
Lassells v. Cornwallis, 2 Vern. 465 (Ch. 1704) ; see Note (1929) 59 A. L. R. 1510, 1512.
12. See Shattuck v. Burrage, 229 Mass. 448, 451, ii8 N. E. 88, 89o (i9i8).
13. I TIFFAxY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) § 310; cf. Summers, Power of a Life
Tenant to Dispose of a Fee (193o) 6 IND. L. J. 137, 142; (1928) 26 MIcHa. L. REV. 703.
i. There were three suits heard and decided together. One of the others was brought
by the personal representative of a child who died from the meat (Wadliegh v. Foster Beef
Co.) ; the other by the baker for loss of business (Howson v. Foster Beef Co.). In the
former, judgment was the same as in the principal case, in the latter a new trial was granted
because there was privity.
2. Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability (1919) 5 IOwA L. BuIL. 6, 86;
Note (1921) 70 U. OF PA. L. REV. 219.
3. Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925) ; Haley v. Swift & Co., 152 Wis.
570, 14o N. W. 292 (1913).
4. UNrFORm SALEs AcT, § 15 (2).
5. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, iII N. E. 785 (1916) ; Chysky v. Drake Bros.
Co., 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923) ; I WufIzsTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 489.

6. Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P. (2d) 199 (1933) ; Rainwater v. Hattiesburg
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 3,5, 95 So. 444 (923); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27
Ohio App. 475, I61 N. E. 557 (928).
7. Hertzler v. Mans'hum, 228 Mich. 416, 2oo N. W. I55 (1924) ; Cassini v. Curtis Candy
Co., 113 N. J. L. 91, 172 Atl. 519 (Sup. Ct. 1934).

8. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920) (error to force
plaintiff to elect between tort and warranty) ; Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 At. 931
But cf. Tavani v. Swift & Co., 262
(1915), writ of error dismissed, 241 U. S. 69o (9x16).
Pa. 184, lO5 Atl. 61 (1918).
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With these bases of liability in mind, it is pertinent to discover what parties are
subject to liability. In an overwhelming preponderance of these cases a manufacturer or packer is defendant. 9 The theory has been advanced that his liability is predicated on the representations which he makes to the consumer.10
Much stronger than this, however, is the public policy to protect human life.
Since in no field of law is this policy stronger than in that dealing with the
manufacture and sale of food, 1 it is eminently desirable that those through
whose hands food passes should be held to the highest degree of care. It seems
clear that this salutary result could more easily be attained were middlemen, as
well as manufacturers, subject to suit by consumers,12 rather than immune because of the absence of privity of contract.' 3 Although for practical reasons
it might be unfair to require of them the same high duty of care required of
manufacturers-which in many instances amounts almost to an "insurer's liability"-' 4 it would seem expedient to apply to middlemen the rule of res ipsa
loquitur.'5 This would be especially appropriate in a case like the principal one,
where it was affirnatively shown that the meat was diseased when it left defendant's hands.'"

Taxation-Liability of Persons and Property-Right of Government to
Reach Income of Spendthrift Trust for Back Taxes Due from BeneficiaryThe federal government, holding a claim for unpaid income taxes and penalties
against the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, asserted a statutory lien on the
income of the trust.' A receiver having been appointed for judgment creditors
of the beneficiary, the latter petitioned for an order directing the trustees to pay2
over the income to him. Held, that under New York spendthrift trust statutes,
and because of public policy, such income was inalienable even by the federal
taxing authorities, and that the trustees, therefore, pay over the income to the
beneficiary (except for ten per cent to which receiver is entitled under New
York law 2). In re Rosenberg's Estate, 153 Misc. 46, 274 N. Y. Supp. 482
(Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 243 App. Div. 687, 277 N. Y. Supp. 938 (Ist Dep't
1935) .
New York, together with other jurisdictions that recognize spendthrift
trusts,5 has, in the recent past, demonstrated a willingness to minimize the
9. Notes (1922) 17 A. L. R. 672, at 688; (1925) 39 A. L. R. 995; (1929) 63 A. L. R.
343; (934) 88 A. L. R. 530.
io. i WiiusaroN, SATEs (2d ed. 1924) § 244a; (1932) 45 HAv. L. REv. 1415, 1418.
ii. See Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 2oo Fed. 322, 323 (S. D. N. Y. 1912).
12. In the form of a tort action, in those states which have decided that implied warranties under the Sales Act do not run. Of course those states allowing implied warranties to
run as to food have already achieved the desired result. Cases cited note 6, supra.
13. Gearing v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, II N. E. 785 (1916).

14. Perkins, supra note 2, at 95.

15. See note 7, supra.

16. Instant case at 658.
i. Pursuant to 45 STAT. 875, 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (1928).
2. N. Y. Puans. PROP. LAw (2909) § 15; N. Y. Rz.AL PROP. LAW (1909)

§

203.

3. Under N. Y. C. P. A. (292o) § 684, judgment creditors are entitled to a maximum of
ten per cent of all the trust income. The court asserted that the federal government, even as
a judgment creditor, would be in no better position than any other judgment creditor, citing
United States v. Hartpoolian, 24 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). See instant case at 47,
274 N. Y. Supp. at 483. In the case cited, however, the court recognized that the limitation
on the federal government is self-imposed by virtue of 17 STAT. 197 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A.
(1928) § 727. See United States v. Hartpoolian, 24 F. (2d) 646, 648 (C. C. A. 2d, 2928).
4. Argued before the Court of Appeals, September 3o and October I, 1935.
5. The wide majority of American jurisdictions recognize spendthrift trusts. For a list
of the authorities, see I BoGERT, TRuSTS AND TnusTEEs (1935) 723 et seq.
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harmful effects 1 of restraints on alienation by holding that certain favored
creditors may reach the income of such trusts, public policy being the main
basis of these decisions.7 By analogy to these decisions; or by reasoning that,
since the lien in question was born of a law of Congress and not of a judgment,
the government was not a creditor in the sense of the New York statutes; or
else by reasoning that the government was not such a creditor as the settlor
intended to exclude,8 the court could have established a more desirable precedent. Its failure to do so would appear to bring it into conflict with federal
income tax law, which provides for an automatic lien on all property 10 (with
specified exemptions 11) belonging to the defaulting taxpayer. 12 The effect of
this decision is to create an additional exemption in the form of spendthrift
trust income, contrary to the established rule that states cannot, without permission of Congress, make additional exemptions. 13 Obviously, two conflicting
principles operate in the case. Recognition of spendthrift trusts is founded on
the broad principle that the owner of property should be free to dispose of it as
he pleases; tax liens on the theory that the sovereign, to maintain its existence,
must be free to collect revenues. 14 Policy dictates that freedom to dispose of
property be subordinated to the sovereign powers of the State. The government should be permitted, subject to self-imposed humanitarian limitations, to
reach all property of the tax debtor.

Torts-Insurers of Joint Tortfeasors-Right of Contribution-Casualty
Co. issued policy agreeing to indemnify 1 A motor company against liability for
wrongful death caused by operation of its motor vehicles. Indemnity Co. issued
a similar policy to B motor company. Later, P secured a joint judgment against
both tortfeasors, the indemnitees A and B, for concurring negligence in the
operation of their respective vehicles. To prevent execution of levy against
property of A, Casualty Co. paid the larger part of the judgment, then brought
action to compel Indemnity Co. to contribute its share of the obligation. Held
(one justice dissenting), that since no co-surety relationship had been estab6. For a fiery criticism of spendthrift trusts, see preface to GA-Y, RESTAINTS

ON

ALIENATION OF PRoPERTY (2d ed. 1895).

7. See cases cited in Explanatory Notes to RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (Tent. Draft, 1931)
§ 153; I BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 5, § 223.
8. Cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 573, 172 Atl. 36 (934).
9. Oddly enough, this is the first reported case involving an attempt by a taxing authority
to reach spendthrift trust income. For a discussion, see Griswold, Reaching the Interest of
the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust (193o) 43 HARv. L. REv. 63, 68.

io. In other connections, it has been held that the income of a spendthrift trust is property belonging to the beneficiary. Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 573, 172 Atl. 36
(1934) ; Metcalfe v. Union Trust Co., 181 N. Y. 39, 73 N. E. 498 (19o5), semble; see Brearley School v. Ward, 2O N. Y. 358, 371, 377, 94 N. E. 1001, 1005, loo8 (1911).
Ii. Household goods, tools, etc. 43 STAT. 343 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 116 (1928).

12. 45 STAT. 875, 26 U. S. C. A. § 115 (928), cited note I, mspra.
13. Cannon v. Nicholas, io F. Supp. 718 (D. Colo. 1935) (life insurance policy) ; Staley
v. Vaughan, 5o S. W. (2d) 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (homestead); cf. Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat. i (U. S. 1825) ; Bank of United States v. Halstead, io Wheat.. 22 (U. S.
1825) ; see Fink v. O'Neil, io6 U. S. 272, 276 (1882) ; McGuirk v. Kyle, io F. Supp. 705, 707
(E. D. Pa. I935).
14. See United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210, 214 (1892).

i. The policies were not the typical indemnity policies containing "no action" clauses,
but were regulated by a statute allowing the judgment creditor to proceed directly against the
insurer once judgment was obtained against the insured. Onio GEN. CODE § 9510-3, 4; see
VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 193o) § 178.
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lished, no right to contribution existed. United States Casualty Co. v. Indemnity
Ins. Co. of North Anerica, I29 Ohio St. 391, 195 N. E. 850 (1935).
2
Although it is clear that a co-surety relationship was not established, it
3
does not follow that the right to contribution should have been denied. Contribution is an equitable doctrine applied when one of several persons who have
been equally liable for the same debt or obligation has paid more than his proportionate share. 4 The instant case followed the rule prevalent in the majority
of jurisdictions, that there can be no contribution between joint tortfeasors; and concluded that since the indemnitor has generally no better right than his
indemnitee 6 contribution should be denied to him as well. The logic of such
an approach, however, is weakened by a consideration of the reasons behind the
rule of non-contribution. Those usually cited are based on public policy, being:
(I) that denial of contribution between tortfeasors punishes them for past conduct and acts as a deterrent factor in shaping future conduct; (2) that the
courts will not adjudicate private matters between admitted wrongdoers.7 These
reasons may have application to litigation between joint tortfeasors who have
been guilty of intentional wrongdoing, but their applicability to the case of
negligent tortfeasors is less obvious, and denial of contribution to the latter on
these grounds has been criticized.8 But even in a jurisdiction which, like that
in the principal case, denies contribution between negligent joint tortfeasors,
there is no justification for the extension of the rule to include their insurers;
the latter are not simply innocent of any wrong-their greatest interest is opposed to the commission of such wrong. 9 The bases for the rule against contribution were thus entirely absent in the instant case, and its application seems
clearly ill-advised.
2. For distinction between contracts of suretyship and contracts of indemnity against
liability see McManus v. Tralles, 253 S. W. 406, 409 (1923) ; ARANT, SuRnrYsHn' (1931)
§§ 4, 5.
3. See Wells v. Miller, 66 N. Y. 255, 258 (1876) ; Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, I Cox
318, 320 (Ex. 1787) (contribution allowed on principles of equity and not based on contract) ;
Note (1903) 98 AmI. ST. RE. 31 (situations where contribution will be allowed) ; The Law
of Contribution (1869) 8 Am. L. REG. (iz. s.) 449.
4. Putnam v. Misochi, 189 Mass. 421, 75 N. E. 956 (igo5) ; Aspinwall v. Sacchi, 57
N. Y. 331 (1874) ; see Asylum of St. Vincent de Paul v. McGuire, 239 N. Y. 375, 382, 146
N. E. 632, 634 (925).
5. HARPER, TORTS (I933) § 303. Contra: Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn.
; Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231
414, 236 N. W. 766 (i3i)
(1928) ; Haines v. Duffy, 2o6 Wis. 193, 24o N. W. 152 (i93i). These states have all abolished the common law rule of the majority by means of judicial decisions rather than
statute. At least twelve states have passed statutes allowing contribution between tortfeasors. See Note (1931) 45 HA.Rv. L. R-v. 369 for a list of these states and a review of
their statutes. The majority rule had its origin in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T. R. 186 (K.
B. 1799). See Reath, Contribution between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan (1898) 12 HARv. L. REv. 176.
6. Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (192i) ; United States Casualty
Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. R. Ry. Co., 218 Ky. 455, 29, S. W. 709 (1927) ; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. 194 (193o), (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 507;
Note (1921)

5 MINN. L. REV. 370.

7. See Pierson v. Thompson, I Edw. Ch. 212, 218 (N. Y. 1831) ; Thweatt's Adm'r. v.
Jones, I Rand. 328, 333 (Va. 1823) ; CooLuY, TORTs (4th ed. 1932) § 89; Leflar, Contribution
and Indemnity between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 13o.
8. See Reath, supra note 5, at 192 et seq.; Leflar, supra; note 7, at 137 et seq.; Quarles,
Contribution between Joint Tortfeasors (1917) I MARQ. L. REv. 141.
9. Langmaid, Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the Law of Suretyship and InsurOnce (934) 47 HAzy. L. REv. 976.
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Torts-Joint Tortfeasors--Liability of One Who Had Abandoned
Unlawful Race for the Acts of Another-Defendant and X having, pursuant
to agreement, started to race over a highway, defendant abandoned the race.
X, without knowledge of defendant's abandonment, negligently struck plaintiff's decedent. Held, that defendant was liable for negligently causing death; 1
because, his abandonment of the race not having been communicated, he was
liable for the acts of X. Saisa v. Lilja, 76 F. (2d) 381 (C. C. A. Ist, 1935).
It is well settled that where the concurrent negligence of tortfeasors contributes to cause injury, if they acted in concert, 2 or if the act of one ordinarily
and naturally produced the act of the other,3 liability is joint and several. 4 That
an injury would not have occurred "but for" the negligence of one, does not
relieve the other who was himself negligent; I nor does the fact that only one
of the tortfeasors actually inflicted the physical damage.6 Moreover, it is not
necessary for liability to attach to one that he be actively present at the moment
of damage by the other. "One who by advice, counsel, or command, procures
another to do wrong may be held equally with the actual perpetrators," 7 and is
liable for such damage as "naturally and proximately" follows the tortious conduct of the other.8 The instant case raised the problem of the limit of such
liability for the torts of another, and for the first time questioned whether or
not the civil law recognizes the "locus penitentiae" 9 of the criminal law so as
to relieve the tortfeasor. The court in the instant case held the responsibility
of each for the acts of the other to last "as long as either continued to act under
the agreement of the race without knowledge of its abandonment by the other,
and within the scope of it." 10 The court was actuated solely by criminal cases
which have held that, to relieve one of liability for the acts of the other, there
must be a communication of the withdrawal under such circumstances as to
permit the other party also to withdraw. 1 In general, courts have also held
that the withdrawal must be voluntary, 12 and that the intent to withdraw must
i. Under Massachusetts statute, damages for negligently causing death are assessed as a
penalty according to the degree of culpability. MAss. GEN. LA-ws (Doman & Wiggin 1932)
c. 229, § 5.
223 N. Y. 284, Iig N. E. 563 (1918).
2. De Carvalho et al. v. Brunner et al.,
3. Hanrahan v. Cochran, 12 App. Div. 91, 42 . Y. Supp. 1032 (4th Dep't, I896) ; Clark
v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. D. 327, 47 L. J.Q. B. 427 (1878).
4. Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 Pac. 577 (193o) ; Hegerty v.Berger, 304 Pa. 221,

155 Atl. 484 (193i) ; McKenna v. Stephans and Hull, 2 Ir. R. 112 (923).
5.Sullivan v. Wm. Ohlhaver Co., 291 Ill. 359, 126 N. E. 191 (192o); Gay v. Samples,
227 Mo. App. 771, 57 S. W. (2d) 768 (I933).
One
6. Jones v. Northwestern Auto Supply Co., 93 Mont. 224, i8 P. (2d) 305 (933).
of two racing cars struck the decedent, hurling him to the ground. The court held the defendant jointly liable whether he had run over the decedent or not. "It is not negligence in
driving . . . over the body of the decedent but negligence in racing . . . which concurred. . . " Id. at 234, 18 P. (2d) at 3o8.
7. Wilder v. Gardiner, 39 Ga. App. 6o6, 147 S. E. 9ii (1929) ; cf. Bums v. Horkan, 126
Ga. 6I, 54 S. E. 946 (i9o6) ; Rose v. Gypsum City, 104 Kan. 412, 179 Pac. 348 (1919);
Hilmes v. Stroebel, 59 Wis. 74, 17 N. W. 539 (1883).
8. De Bardeleben v. Sellers, 17 Ala. App. 247, 84 So. 403 (1919) ; Rush v. Town of
Farmerville et al., 156 La. 857, 101 So. 243 (924) ; State v. Hurst, 153 Minn. 525, 193 N. W.
68o (1922).
9. Where one agrees to engage in a crime, but abandons his intention before the crime is
committed, he may be not guilty. Pinkard v. State, 30 Ga. 757 (i86o).
IO. Instant case at 381.

II. State v. Allen, 47 Conn. 121 (1879) ; Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 256 Mass. 387,
(These were the only cases cited by the court on this point.) To the
same effect are People v. Button, lo6 Cal. 628, 39 Pac. 1073 (1895) ; State v. Webb, 216 Mo.
LAW (i1th ed. 1912) ' § 267.
378, II 5 S. W. 998 (I9O9) ; WHARTON, CiaIiNAL
Where defendant was held by the
12. State v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926).
police while his confederates killed in the course of a robbery, he had not "abandoned" so as
,to escape responsibility for the murder.
152

N. E. 380 (1926).
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be objectively manifested.' 3 It is submitted that the holding in the instant case
was correct, and the analogy from criminal law justifiable. Though the factual
situation presents a problem as to how the intent to abandon could have been
communicated but by continuing in liability-creating conduct, still the dangers
of highway racing with modem high speed cars are so great as to justify the
imposition of this high degree of liability on those who use roads without due
consideration for others rightfully thereon.

Trusts-Revocation-Right of Settlor Who Has Reserved Power of
Appointment to Exercise It in Such Fashion as Would Terminate the Trust
-Settlor created an antenuptial trust of personal property for herself for
life, and at her death for her "children or remoter issue" as she should appoint,
and, in default of appointment, for her children equally. After her marriage
and the birth of two children, settlor appointed by deed to her unborn grandchildren, and then attempted to revoke the trust. A statute provided that all
persons beneficially interested must consent to revocation.' Held, that the
attempted revocation was inoperative, because the consent of settlor's children
was necessary. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Harris, 267 N. Y. I, 195
N. E. 529 (1935).

At their birth, the children in the instant case received vested remainders 2
subject to being partially 3 or totally 4 divested. Thus, prior to the appointment, they were beneficially interested within the meaning of the statute and,
at the same time, their infancy precluded their consent to a revocation. 5 Evidently the settlor thought that by exercising her power of appointment in favor
of persons not yet in being she could divest the children of their interests and
so be able to revoke by her act alone.6 But it is manifest from the very nature
of the trust indenture, made as it was in contemplation of marriage, that the
mere exercise of the power was not intended to cause such divestiture.7 Such
being the case, there is much authority indicating that the children would retain
their beneficial interests until the appointment should become effective. Thus
where an appointment exceeds the authority given,8 or where the power itself,9
13. State v. Allen, 47 Conn. 121 (1879) ; State v. Klein et al., 97 Conn. 321, 116 At. 596
State v. Taylor et al., 173 La. IoO, 139 So. 463 (1934).

(1922) ;
I.

N.

Y.

PEns. PROP. LAW (I909)

§23.

(3d ed. 1915) §§ 112, 112a.
3. By the subsequent birth of additional children.
4. By their deaths prior to the settlor's, or through the exercise of the power of appoint2. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PERPETuITIEs

ment.
5. Gage v. Irving Bank & Trust Co., 222 App. Div.

92, 225 N. Y. Supp. 476 (2d Dep't
1927) ; Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, i65 N. E. 454 (1929). But cp.
Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170, 256 N. Y. Supp. 563 (Ist
Dep't 1932), aff'd without opiltiO)Z, 26o N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932).
6. Neither a failure to reserve the right to revoke, nor a provision that the trust shall be
irrevocable, will destroy the settlor's right to revocation under Section 23 of the New York
statute. Aranyi v. Bankers Trust Co., 201 App. Div. 7o6, i94 N. Y. Supp. 614 (ist Dep't
1922) ; Franklin v. Chatham Phenix Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 234 App. Div. 369, 255 N. Y.

Supp. 115 (ist Dep't,

1932).

7. The obvious purpose of the trust was to preserve the property intact
lineal descendants. If mere appointment divested the children's interests, and
ment was invalid, the property would fall into settlor's intestate estate and
would take a larger share.
8. See Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365, 374, 39 N. E. 368, 371 (1895).
AGAIN ST PERPEMTITIES (3d ed. 1915) § 256.

9. Id. §§ 258, 535.

for settlor's
the appointher husband
GRAY, RULE
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or the appointment,' 0 is void for remoteness, or where the appointment is ineffective through non-occurrence of a contingency," the property subject to the
power passes as in default of appointment. Accordingly, if the mother in the
instant case should die while the grandchildren were yet unborn, the children
would take the principal of the trust. They should therefore be regarded as
still beneficially interested. 1 2 While the court recognized this, it declined to
discuss the problem raised by the Appellate Division 1 as to whether the unborn
grandchildren also were beneficially interested in the trust, so as to require the
selection of a representative for them and his consent to the revocation. The
statute has been interpreted by at least two Appellate Division cases'14 as requiring the consent of only those persons beneficially interested who are in
being. These statements have been criticized 15 as being mere dicta, as being
inconsistent with the actual wording of the statute,"' and as being contrary to
the presumed intention of the legislature.' 7 It is regrettable that the Court of
Appeals failed to take this opportunity to settle the question.

Wills-Equity-Rights of Residuary Legatee-Sequestration of Widower's Rejected Life Interest-Testatrix' surviving spouse elected to assert
his statutory privilege' of claiming against the will, thereby depleting a trust
fund which had been bequeathed to him for life, thereafter to be liquidated
and delivered to the residuary legatee. The trustees petitioned the court to construe the will. Held, that the renounced testamentary disposition be sequestered
to compensate the disappointed legatee. Trustees of Kenyon College v. Cleveland Trust Co., 196 N. E. 784 (Ohio 1935).

A donee's election to take an immediate share at law and reject a life
estate ordinarily brings about acceleration of the remainders.' This doctrine
has its genesis in the common law tenet that one having a legal estate in land is
io. Id. § 534.

ii. Lakin v. Lakin, 34 Beav. 443 (Ch. 1865).
12. Another possible ground for the court's conclusion which it failed to mention is that
the appointment to the unborn grandchildren was a fraud upon the power, inasmuch as it
was made rather to benefit the settlor than to carry out the purpose for which the power was
created. The donee of a special power of appointment must act in good faith in his exercise of the power, and this is true even though he is also the donor. Wellesley v. Mornington, 2 K. & J. 143 (Ch. 1855) ; Topham v. Portland, I De G. J. & S. 517 (1864) ; CHAPIn
ExlREss TRuSTS AND PowERs (1897) § 661, 665.
13. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 242 App. Div. 819, 275 N. Y. Supp. 649 (Ist Dep't
1934) (question certified to the Court of Appeals).
14. Cram v. Walker, 173 App. Div. 8o4, 16o N. Y. Supp. 486 (Ist Dep't, 1916) ; Aranyi
v. Bankers Trust Co., 2oi App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614 (ist Dep't 1922).

15.

(1935)

44

YAI L.

J.

9o1.

16. Section 23 of the N. Y. PEns. PROP. LAW (igog) provides that the settlor may revoke "upon the written request of all the persons beneficially interested".
17. Section 15 of the N Y. PERs. PRop. LAW prohibited the assignment or alienation by
the beneficiary of the income from the trust. Section 23, by allowing the beneficiary to consent to a revocation, was designed to mitigate this disability. But Section 15 expressly does
not apply to interests in remainder, as distinguished from interests in income. Hence Section 23 could not reasonably have been intended to change the common law rule against
revocation of a trust where there were unborn beneficiaries. 2 PERRY, TluSTS (7th ed.
1929) § 92o.

Ormo (Throckmorton, 1930) § 10504-55.
Northern Trust Co. v. Wheaton, 249 Ill. 6o6, 94 N. E. 98o (1911); Davidson v.
Miners and Mechanics Trust Co., 129 Qhio St. 418, 195 N. E. 845 (935). Contra: Cassidy v.
Padgett, igo N. E. 133 (Ind. App. 1934), 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. 149. The instant case and
those cited are concerned with vested remainders. As to whether acceleration applies to contingent remainders, there are conflicting views. See Note (1920) 5 A. L. R. 473.
I. CoDE oF
2.
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entitled to possession unless there is a prior particular estate interposed. Therefore, the elimination of the spouse's intervening estate entitles the legatee's
sequent legal estate to possession.3 However, this principle has often been
modified by equity to give relief whenever acceleration of the various estates
following the rejected life estate would cause hardship to the residuary legatee.4
This qualification of the principle of acceleration of remainders is accomplished,
as in the instant case, by sequestration of the remaining portion of the spouse's
life interest. 5 The equitable sequestration principle is followed by a majority
7
of courts, 6 many giving as their reason a desire to follow the testator's intent.
But since the minority, purporting to use the identical criterion, arrive at the
opposite result,8 it is not strange that other dogmas also influence the decisions.
The minority courts, which place the loss on the residuary legatee, often have
a feeling that the factual situation is analogous to the death of the life tenant,9
3. See i TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) § 146.
4. Kirschner v. Kirschner, 71 Misc. 57, 127 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1911) ; In re Lonergan's
Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 Atl. 387 (I93I), 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 454.

5. The difficulty of seeing the mathematical advantages of this procedure has added to
the confusion of the courts and led to conflicting views. For example, see In re Lonergan's
Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 146, 154 AtI. 387, 389 (I93I), in which Justice Simpson criticized the
mathematics of Justice Mitchell in Estate of Vance, 141 Pa. 20i, 213, 21 Atl. 643, 645 (1891).

Using the instant case as an illustration, the following demonstrates the various situations:
A. If the widower had taken under the will
$600,000
Trust fund left to him for life (approximately) ................................
252,000
Specific legacies to be distributed upon his death .................................
$248,000
Remainder for residuary legatee ...........................................
B. If the court had accelerated the remainders
................... $6oo,ooo
Trust fund to be liquidated immediately .............
$3ooooo
Widower's distributive share by law ...................................
Specific legacies immediately due ......................................

Total to take before the residuary legatee .......................................
Remainder for residuary legatee ...........................................
C. The solution of the instant case by sequestration

Trust fund to be partially liquidated ...........................................
Widower's distributive share by law ............................................

252,000
552,000

$ 48,00o
$oo,ooo
3ooooo

$3oo,ooo
Remainder to be sequestered until widower's death ..........................
Assuming that the widower will live long enough, this amount will double itself at
4 per cent compound interest in 17 years and 246 days, totaling ...............
Specific legacies to be distributed then ..........................................

$6oo,ooo
252,ooo

$248,00o
Remainder to residuary legatee ............................................
6. Wakefield v. Wakefield, 256 Ili. 296, IOO N. E. 275 (1912) ; Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt.
391, 22 Atl. 630 (1891) ; also cases cited note 4, supra. Pennsylvania has had a pendulumlike history in this field. Young's Appeal, lo8 Pa. 17 (1884) sequestered the rejected life
estate, but the court virtually overruled itself in Ferguson's Estate, 138 Pa. 208, 2o AtI. 945
(189o).

Then in In re Lonergan's Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 154 Atl. 387- (1931), the court re-

ttarned to the sentiment expressed in Young's Appeal, m.pra.
7. See Hinkley v. House of Refuge, 4o Md. 461, 469 (1874); Adams v. Legroo, IIi Me.
3o2, 304, 89 Atl. 63, 64 (1913).
8. See Church Home v. Morris, 99 Ky. 317, 323, 36 S. W. 2, 3 (1896) ; Crocker v.
Crocker, 230 Mass. 478, 482, 12o N. E. i1O, 112 (igi8). Although it is undoubtedly true

that observation of the intent of the testator is the cardinal rule of the construction of wills
(cf. THoompSON, CoNsTRucrroN OF WmIs (1928) § 4), yet, in the case where the surviving
spouse elects to take against the will, the intent of the testator is immediately frustrated, and
thereafter any attempt to observe it is pure guessing.
9. "The election of the widow is equivalent to her death." Estate of Vance, 141 Pa. 2O,
However, courts often recognize that lip service to phrases
213, 21 Atl. 643, 645 (1891).
may do irreparable injustice. "Courts of equity are not bound by such phrases as that 'the
" Simpson, J., in In re Lonergan's
election of the widow is equivalent to her death'
Estate, 303 Pa. 142, 147, 154 Atl. 387, 389 (1931).
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and that consequently similar legal relations should follow. But death of the
life tenant never causes diminution of the residue. Equally misleading is the
attempt to decide whether or not to apply the equitable doctrine of sequestration
by determining whether "the residuary legatee was in fact a preferred object
of the testator's bounty." 10 This test has been ably criticized."- Nevertheless,
despite the fact that the reasoning in this field has been generally illogical, the
majority of courts arrive at unquestionably sound results-influenced chiefly,
no doubt, by a practical sense of justice.
io. Church Home v. Morris, 99 Ky. 317, 323, 36 S. W. 2, 3 (1896). It is interesting to
note that although courts have stressed this point, no case can be found involving a will which
declares, "The residuary legatee is a preferred (or chief) object of my bounty."
ii. "It is submitted that this places the rule on an illusory and unsatisfactory basis."
Meek v. Trotter, 133 Tenn. 145, 157, ISo S. W. 176, 179 (1915).

